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Abstract 
This essay comes from an assignment given in the philosophy class: Great Books in 
Philosophy. This is the Philosophy 1030 class offered at Xavier University. The assignment was 
based on reading a section of William L. Rowe’s book, Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction. 
The section in the book focused on the ideas of human free will and God’s divine 
foreknowledge. More importantly, it was centered on the problem of whether or not divine 
foreknowledge and human freedom can coexist. An argument posed by Rowe presents the view 
that humans lack free will because God knows beforehand everything that we will do. This paper 
thoroughly reviews Rowe’s argument and thoughtfully considers each premise. The challenge of 
the assignment was to find ways to prove or disprove each premise in a way that could lead to 
proof that divine foreknowledge and human freedom can exist at the same time. Critical thinking 
and examination of the book written by Rowe was employed to present the solutions that follow. 
My stance is against Rowe’s argument as I attempt to show that humans can have free will even 
if God’s divine foreknowledge allows Him to know everything we will do before we have done 
it ourselves. My interpretation is that the argument itself is misleading and causes people to 
confuse foreknowledge with foreordainment by God.  
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Consider a question that takes hours, days, or even years of debate before reaching a 
decision. Multiple options are weighed, and a decision is made. This could be a decision as 
uncomplicated as what clothes to wear for a job interview or one as complex as a college student 
selecting the best school to attend. What if all the planning and consideration that led to that 
decision were for nothing? What if the decision was already made by God before anyone even 
considered it? If God has divine foreknowledge, meaning He knows all even before something 
happens, He has knowledge about what a person would do, and any given decision is not freely 
made. This is a highly unnerving possibility to most people. Humans would like to believe that 
the choices they spend so much time making are really choices that are theirs to be made. 
Humans value freedom of choice: they do not want to think that these decisions are already made 
for them in advance. 
 
Philosophers have debated whether human freedom exists alongside divine 
foreknowledge. The main argument seems to be that if God knows everything people will do, 
then their choices are not free. In Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction, philosopher William 
L. Rowe discusses the problem of coexistence of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. Can 
these two ideas coexist? Rowe proffers that if divine foreknowledge exists, human freedom 
cannot. He provides four premises for his argument: 
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1. God knows before we are born everything we will do. 
2. If God knows before we are born everything we will do, then it is never in our power 
to do otherwise. 
3. If it is never in our power to do otherwise, then there is no human freedom. 
Therefore, 
4. There is no human freedom. 
Humans feel uncomfortable when told they operate minus freedom and choice. Rowe’s argument 
suggests that because God knows what people will do, it takes away their freedom of choice. 
Yet, nowhere in Rowe’s argument does he say that God foreordains what we will do (chooses 
and forces events to occur), but simply that God knows what will come to pass. This is an idea I 
would like to revisit after some clarification of the argument as it stands.1 
 
To clarify Rowe’s argument, each premise will be engaged (points 1-3). Premise 1 comes 
from the idea that God is omniscient (all-knowing). This is a factor that Rowe presents in the 
beginning of the book as a basic attribute of God. If God is all-knowing, this includes 
foreknowledge (knowing what humans will do before they are born). The next one is a bit 
trickier. In premise 2, the basic idea is rooted in the fact that humans cannot change the past. 
Simply put, from God’s perspective, what humans do now is already a fact of the past. A fact of 
the past means it has already occurred in the past. If one cannot change the past, then one cannot 
change what God already knows will happen. This means it is not in a person’s power to do 
anything other than what God already commands as foreknowledge. 
  
Before beginning with premise 3, human freedom must be defined. The working idea of 
human freedom is such that a choice is only free if a person can actually do either option that is 
offered. For example, a person is asked to choose between a black shirt and a red shirt, having 
seen neither because both are in another room. Let us also say that there is only a black shirt in 
the room and no red. Given that black is the person’s favorite color, the black shirt is chosen. Is 
the choice free? A free choice is defined relative to both options being possible at the time the 
decision is made. This means the choice in shirts is not free, because the red shirt option is not a 
possibility, leaving no honest choice, but simply a black shirt in the next room.  
 
With this definition of human freedom in mind, premise 3 acknowledges that if humans 
cannot change the past, they cannot freely choose anything other than what God knows they will 
do. Because humans cannot choose, there is no human freedom. There is only one option, and 
the second option leads to the impossible, such as the non-existent red shirt in the example. Last, 
the logical conclusion to premises 1, 2, and 3 together is what premise 4 states: there is no human 
freedom. Since divine foreknowledge (knowledge of all that has and will happen) is available to 
God, based on the premises above, one can conclude that humans are not free to do as they wish 
because their path cannot vary from the one God already knows they will take. 
 
In light of the argument presented above, several solutions have been offered to try to 
show that human freedom and divine foreknowledge can, in fact, coexist. The solutions find 
ways to show that even if God has knowledge of a person’s choice, this does not take away the 
                                                 
1 The following clarifications and justifications are all adapted from Philosophy of Religion An Introduction.  
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freedom in the choice because He is not foreordaining and forcing the person to do His will. 
Three solutions will be shared.  
 
The first solution is an attack on the third premise of the argument, challenging the 
meaning of human freedom. There are those who would look at the example with the shirts and 
say that the choice is still a free choice, even though the other available option is only an option 
in name. Choosing the black shirt was a decision made freely. Outside factors do not matter. It 
does not matter that the red shirt is not real, because the black one was chosen. Most would agree 
however, that a truly free choice is one a person could make and follow through no matter which 
option is decided on. Thus, this solution is plausible, but not a great one.  
 
The second solution is tricky, but has a better fighting chance of standing up to the 
argument than the first. With this solution, to prove that divine foreknowledge and human 
freedom coexist, premise 2 must be rejected, saying that it is in one’s power to do things other 
than what God knows one will do. Rowe introduces an idea proposed by philosopher William of 
Ockham. Ockham challenges the claim that we do not have the power to determine the past. 
Here, two types of facts need to be explained: facts that are “simply” about the past, and facts 
that are “not simply” about the past. As an example, on September 11, 2001, planes crashed into 
the Twin Towers in New York. This is a fact that is simply about the past. It is such because 
there is no way to change what happened, as it has completely happened at a time before now. 
Now consider a second fact. On September 11th, 2001 the Twin Towers in New York were 
attacked, beginning a war between the United States and Iraq that is ongoing.2 Years from now 
‘is ongoing’ will be changed to a finite time period. At that time, it will become a fact that is 
simply about the past. Today, however, it is not simply a fact about the past. It roots itself in the 
past as the beginning of the war started in the past, but, as it has yet to finish, it also takes root in 
the present and is expanding into the future. Facts that are not simply about the past have room to 
be changed until the time where they become simply about the past. The choices made toward an 
end to the war in Iraq will determine what the fact of the past will be at the end. If it ends 
tomorrow, the fact of the past will be that the war was from 2001-2009, but if it ends in 2011 the 
dates change such to reflect that. Thereby, the future fact of the past is subject to change 
according to choices that can be made in the present.  
 
Basically, if a fact is simply about the past, it cannot change. Facts that are not simply 
about the past, however, can be altered. If this is possible, then it gives humans the power to 
change the past. Even though not every fact can be changed, this solution gives us the power to 
change some facts of the past, which would disprove 2 and render the premise useless. Any way 
a premise can be attacked and proven false can help prove that God knowing in advance what we 
will do does not rob us of human freedom to make choices for ourselves. 
 
The third solution is one that attacks the first premise and is most credible. There are 
actually two forms of this solution, with the second being more credible. The first form of the 
solution Rowe says is more radical, as it claims that foreknowledge is not possible. It is a 
solution Rowe attributes to Aristotle. Basically, it is based on the fact that knowledge is based on 
truth. A statement about something that might or might not happen at a future time is neither true 
nor false until it does or does not happen. If it is not true, it cannot be foreknown. For example, if 
                                                 
2 The example used here is adapted from a similar example in Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction. 
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someone said they were taking their child to the zoo Saturday, it can be neither true nor false 
until Saturday passes. If knowledge is only based on truth, and there is no truth until after the 
event has occurred, then there can be no foreknowledge. In this we can see that human freedom 
of choice leads to a knowledge of that choice, but does not allow for foreknowledge. This would 
take away the idea of divine foreknowledge altogether. This would seem to let human freedom 
breathe easy, but the option where the two can exist at the same time will still be explored. 
 
The second form of this solution takes hold in the fact that God is eternal and omniscient. 
Early in his text, Rowe discusses a list of basic attributes of God; being eternal and omniscient 
are two such attributes. Omniscience is defined as having infinite knowledge, and eternal is 
defined as existing in an infinite number of temporal parts and outside the laws of time. A 
temporal part is defined as a specific space in time. For example, one can look at yesterday as 
being one temporal part in time, today being one more, and tomorrow being yet another. The law 
of time states that we can only exist in one place and one time and only have one temporal part 
available at a time. As humans bound by the laws of time, only one temporal part is available at 
any given time. The clock cannot be rewound to relive a day that has already happened, nor is it 
possible to jump ahead a few years and see what will be going on then. God, however, is not 
bound by the laws of time as humans are, and has all temporal parts available to Him at once. In 
this way, everything that happens, every moment in time, is ever present to God.  
 
Rowe presents an idea by another known philosopher, Boethius, to help with this solution 
by helping clear up the definition of foreknowledge. In one sense, foreknowledge is such that it 
happens when someone knows some event will happen before it happens, provided that the being 
exists in a time before said event will occur. This type of foreknowledge would require God to 
exist inside of a certain time to say that some event would occur at a later time. If God is eternal 
in the sense previously described, this foreknowledge is not possible because He exists outside of 
time. Foreknowledge in the second sense occurs in a way that God foreknows some event, but 
only provided that the occurrence of the event happens in a way that it is present to God after it 
has occurred, even though it has not occurred at the time in which those bound by time exist. In 
this way, even though an event has not occurred to a person in the one temporal part of time 
available to him/her now, God has already experienced it because He has every occurrence 
available at once. To Him, it becomes knowledge of a true fact that has already occurred. We see 
it as foreknowledge because, to us stuck in time, it has not happened yet. In this way, God’s 
basic attributes help Him achieve divine foreknowledge, while we still have human freedom. The 
free choices that one makes produce His divine foreknowledge.  
 
This last solution is the best one. In redefining the idea of foreknowledge based on God’s 
basic attributes it is allowing for the coexistence of human freedom and divine foreknowledge. In 
short, everyone can go home happy. Of course, this final solution is not agreed on by everyone, 
so its objections must be considered.  
 
One objection could be that if God truly has foreknowledge of what will happen, then 
why wouldn’t we revert back to human choices not really being free? Here it could be said the 
easiest way to understand is to say God has knowledge (based on facts that come from events 
that “have happened”) of what humans will do. Because everything is available to Him at once, 
God sees past/present/future all at once. He can see cavemen walking the earth at the same time 
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He can see what people are doing now, as well as what will be happening years from now. 
Because of this, He sees what humans will do in their future, though to Him, it is experienced as 
we experience the “now.” Because He is not tied to ”now,” He has knowledge based on facts that 
have happened from the infinite parts of time available to Him. We just have not caught up yet.  
 
Another objection might be the following: If God knows what will happen, how is one 
free to change the path he/she walks in life? The biggest problem is that people confuse 
foreknowledge with foreordainment. Just because God knows what will happen, this does not 
mean He ordains it or forces one into it. Imagine standing out on the street on a sunny day. A 
shadow is seen coming around the corner of a nearby building. From the shape of the shadow it 
can be concluded that is a person coming. The shadow in no way defines who the person is, 
however. Rather, the person creates the shadow. Foreknowledge is more like the shadow. Just as 
the shadow is created by the reality of the person, God’s foreknowledge is like a foreshadowing 
created by the reality of the choices one makes. If one chooses one path, God will see that path, 
but had a different path been selected, God would have seen that other path. God only sees what 
humans have already chosen; and even though He can see it while they cannot, it is only because 
He is unbound by the laws of time that humans are stuck following. 
 
The last solution presented, that of redefining foreknowledge with God’s basic attributes 
in mind, is the best one. The other two seem to stretch a little further to get around the premises 
they attack. Also, if the very first premise of an argument, that which the argument is built on, 
can be rendered useless, is not the entire argument effectively ruined?  
 
Philosophers use this kind of back and forth argument/solution method to find new 
answers to new questions all the time. A good argument is one that, if the premises are true, the 
conclusion must be true. The philosopher then comes in and attacks any part of a premise to 
disprove it and render the conclusion invalid. Where hard evidence can only get you so far, it is 
the job of the philosopher to pick up and use thoughts and ideas to try to logically work out 
answers to questions you might otherwise think are incapable of being answered.  
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